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Why Support the Occupy Movement?
Kathryn Tanner
I would like to provide a new angle on the Occupy Movement from a Chris-
tian point of view, specifically from the standpoint of my own work as a Christian 
theologian. Christians, I believe, should be supportive of the Occupy Movement 
and not simply for the obvious religious reasons. What are those obvious reasons? 
Christian concerns about social justice, Christian concerns especially for the poor, 
for all those disadvantaged and downtrodden, marginalized and harmed by forms 
of social exclusion and exploitation—such concerns clearly overlap with issues that 
the Occupy Movement has now brought to the forefront of our national con-
sciousness: economic inequity and the economic plight of the 99 percent woefully 
underserved by our political and economic system since the financial crisis hit. 
Christianity and the Occupy Movement are closely aligned on these grounds of 
shared concern—concerns about injustice and about the economic disadvantage 
suffered by so many. But more than this, I believe that basic beliefs of Christian-
ity contain an alternative vision of economic life that helps make sense of and pull 
together coherently the multiple strands of our economic and political predica-
ment targeted for protest by the Occupy Movement—that’s what I want to argue 
now. I’ll try to show what this alternative Christian vision for our economic lives 
is, what the multiple concerns of the Occupy protest are, and how that Christian 
vision of economy brings those multiple strands of protest together.
First let me briefly outline the alternative vision of economy that Christian-
ity provides. One major element of that vision, which I think lies at the very heart 
of Christian belief, is the idea of a society of mutual benefit, a society in which we 
all benefit at the same time from the same sources of wealth generation, a society 
in which we benefit together from wealth produced rather than alone. A soci-
ety of mutual benefit is not simply a society, then, in which some have a lot and 
generously redistribute to others less fortunate than themselves some of what they 
have—in order to equal things out a bit—a society of philanthropic giving. More 
than this, a society of mutual benefit is one in which it makes no sense to benefit 
alone without others benefitting too; such a society therefore implies an economy 
where mechanisms of wealth generation are organized from the start in mutually 
beneficial ways. 
I think a host of very basic Christian beliefs about God’s own life and about 
how God shares God’s life with the world contain within them this sort of vision 
of a society of mutual benefit. Let me give a few examples of Christian beliefs that 
hold up such an alternative vision of economic life.
Within the very life of God—God’s own triune life—as Christians describe 
it, one finds a mutually beneficial kind of production and circulation of the good.  
What each person of the trinity has the others have as well; the very same divine 
life is common to them all. No one member of the trinity can enjoy the good of 
divine life without the others also partaking in it. The good of divine life is pro-
duced within one member of the trinity only as that divine life is circulated to the 
others and found within them as well. And as the good of the divine life circulates 
among them that good never leaves any of them; they all continue to have what 
they provide to others. 
In Christian accounts of the incarnation one finds this same sort of vision of 
community enjoined for the very purpose of ensuring mutual enjoyment of goods 
by the different parties (so to speak) making up Christ’s person—his divinity 
and humanity. Without losing what God has, God becomes incarnate in Christ 
to provide to the humanity of Christ what God continues to enjoy: eternal life, 
for example. By way of the closest community with one another in the person of 
Christ, both the humanity and divinity of Christ come to enjoy, to benefit from, 
the same divine goods, the same divine wealth, one could say, of eternal life. The 
God incarnate in Christ does not lose divine life by providing it to, producing it 
within, Christ’s own resurrected and glorified humanity; and the humanity of 
Christ cannot benefit from divine life alone, without the divinity of Christ, with 
which it is joined, continuing to enjoy it. To the contrary, this is a community 
designed from the very start just to produce mutual enjoyment. 
And similarly with other human beings’ enjoyment of what God offers to 
them in Christ. What God gives to one person by way of Christ God can also give 
to others. This is no zero-sum game; the very life of God can be distributed to all 
without any one coming to benefit at the expense of another. Indeed, the more 
that I am saved simply by God’s free grace, the less I have reason to expect to be 
saved alone; mine becomes a destiny potentially shared with all others, irrespective 
of any difference in circumstance or in individual merits or demerits that might set 
us apart.  What might lead me to question my own salvation is the limited char-
acter of God’s mercy; the more I seem to be saved alone the more reason I have to 
question the generosity of God upon which I depend for my own salvation.
Now what are the multiple concerns of the Occupy Movement and how does 
this Christian vision of an economy of mutual benefit help make sense of them, 
help integrate them, bring them into a coherent picture of the problems we face as 
a nation? Among those multiple concerns, first of all, is a worry about democracy. 
The Occupy Movement is tapping into the suspicion that our democracy is not 
really of the people any more. Our chosen representatives are not working for us; 
we have little ability to influence policy in our own best interests through them. 
Democracy needs to be reconceived; and that’s what Occupy’s General Assemblies 
are—an experiment in a genuinely participatory democracy. The little hope that 
organizers have in the democratic polity we supposedly enjoy is one reason why 
this, unlike other movements for change, has no clear policy recommendations to 
make: it is not trying to influence the powers that be, but to empower people to 
take control of their own lives and come to their own decisions in the very process 
of constructing new forms of political life together. 
A second major concern of the movement is wealth inequality, captured in 
the now famous slogan “we are the 99%,” the 99% who don’t seem to be benefit-
ing economically from the present system, which favors the wealthiest 1% by way, 
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for example, of current tax policy. In 1963 the top federal tax rate was 91%; today 
it is 35%. The tax on long-term capital gains—from selling stock, say—used to be 
20%; now it is 15%. Whatever economic growth there has been over the last few 
decades seems to have gone disproportionately to those at the very top. 
And clearly the movement is drawing a connection between wealth inequal-
ity and the failure of democracy: we don’t live in a genuine democracy but in an 
oligarchy of the wealthy. Money buys influence given the current state of campaign 
finance law, especially after the recent Citizens United Supreme Court decisions, 
and given the extent of corporate lobbying in Washington.
A third major concern is the new economy of debt and risk management—
finance—finance-dominated capitalism, concern about the financial crisis in 
2008, about the government response to it and its aftermath, concern, for example, 
about the continued indebtedness of ordinary Americans, particularly of students 
forced to finance their educations through huge loans, backed by the government 
but at interest rates that don’t seem to fully reflect those guarantees and that are 
therefore higher than need be. 
This concern about the financial system is one galvanizing focus for the 
movement that helps in great part to bring together its other two concerns. 
Consider the slogan commonly chanted: “banks got bailed out, we got sold out.”  
“Sold out” suggests we have been betrayed by the very people chosen to represent 
us. That banks got bailed out and we got sold out makes clear we don’t live in a 
genuine democracy of the people. And it is also a prime example of the inequalities 
of a grossly inequitable sort that the movement protests. The slogan is pointing out 
what easily appears to be an outrageous inequality of treatment on the economic 
front: some people, little people, most of the people, still have to pay their debts 
when things go sour (when the housing market collapses and their homes are 
worth less than their mortgages), while powerful banks, their debts, are immedi-
ately “forgiven,” despite the fact that it was their lax and sometimes even predatory 
lending practices that got us into this mess to begin with.
Now, how does coming at this whole complex of issues from a Christian 
point of view make a difference? I suggest that a Christian vision of an economy 
of mutual benefit helps put all these concerns together into a coherent picture, 
by leading one to ask whether there isn’t some system of wealth production in 
place here—some underlying form of profit generation—giving rise to the wealth 
disparities. In light of that Christian economic vision, one should look at wealth 
inequalities and consider their original causes, the economic system that underlies 
and produces them to begin with. From the Christian point of view I just laid 
out it doesn’t make sense to assume too quickly that the problem here is simply a 
failure to redistribute wealth—through more progressive taxation, say—that the 
problem here is that the wealthy don’t pay their fair share in taxes. One is prompt-
ed by the Christian vision of a society of mutual benefit to ask what is creating the 
prior wealth disparities to begin with, before taxes come into the picture. In other 
words, mightn’t there be some fundamental problem with the original system of 
distribution, some problem with the system of wealth creation (and not simply a 
problem with the processes for redistributing wealth from the already wealthy to 
the less well off)? 
And here I think the finger can be pointed at finance-dominated capitalism, 
that third prong of the Occupy protest—for reasons I’ll get to in a moment. More-
over, it’s because the underlying system of profit generation is thereby so skewed, to 
benefit only a very small portion of the population, that it requires undemocratic 
trends in politics if it’s to be put in place and held in place. So you now begin to 
see how everything hangs together!
In order for all this to make sense, one must be clear about the sort of wealth 
inequalities at issue here.1 One isn’t primarily talking about income gaps across 
the whole spectrum, say between the poor and the middle class, or between the 
educated and not so well educated—but specifically about the gap between the 
very wealthiest 1%—or even between the richest one tenth of a percent, even the 
richest one-hundredth of a percent—and everyone else—between the very top 
and everyone else (including the poor and the middle class, the educated and the 
uneducated). That’s where the huge gap is—between the very top and everyone 
else. And it isn’t the income or wealth disparity per se that is the primary issue but 
income and wealth concentration at the top. The worry isn’t so much—or just—the 
fact that a CEO makes 400 times, say, what the employees of the company typi-
cally make, but that a disproportionate amount of the wealth to go around in that 
company is concentrated at the top, with everyone else making relatively little or 
no gains from profits generated. On the question of wealth concentration for the 
country as a whole, current figures are as high as the richest 1% holding 39-40% 
of the national wealth and 25% of the national income.2 Quite an increase from 
the figures from 2007, before the financial crisis, which showed the top 1% holding 
18% of the share of national income in any one year and 25% if counting capital 
gains from investments and dividends; the richest one in a thousand percent (.1%) 
holding over 12% of the national income; and the richest one in ten thousand 
percent (.01%) holding 6% of national income. The cumulative result of all this 
wealth concentration over the years is that the 1% of the population at the top of 
the economic pyramid now holds as much wealth as the rest of the population put 
together (or at least they hold as much as what 90% of the rest holds). Whatever 
the exact figures, the bottom line is that over the last 30 years the income and 
wealth of everyone else has been holding fairly steady, sometimes even declining, 
especially after the latest financial crisis, while the income and wealth of the top 
tier has been ballooning, multiplying several times over. The 99% are being left 
out, left behind. 
A Christian vision of an alternative economy of mutual benefit makes one 
ask what sort of system for wealth generation this is in which 1% can make enor-
mous wealth while everyone else stays standing in place. Clearly this is a system 
1 See Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the 
Rich Richer—And Turner Its Back on the Middle Class (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), chapter 
one, for more on the figures and analysis in this paragraph.
2 See Gary Dorrien, “The Case Against Wall Street,” Christian Century, November 15, 2011, 
p.22.
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for wealth generation that brings with it no impetus to spread the wealth to begin 
with, through, say, full employment at good wages, across the board.
And what system are we talking about here? I’d say—with the Occupy 
Movement and its third prong of protest—that it has everything to do with a 
finance-dominated form of capitalism. 
In a finance-dominated form of capitalism, finance is not simply an instru-
ment of production, providing needed loans for investment in equipment or to 
cover store inventories, for example.  This sort of capitalism in which finance does 
not dominate is dependent for profit generation on increasing demand for goods 
and services produced. If there is no one with the money to buy those goods and 
services the whole economy is in trouble—finance included because the money 
to pay back loans to businesses is generated in the same way—ultimately through 
the profits generated from selling the goods and services produced by those com-
panies. Just because it is dependent in this way on demand, capitalism, in which 
finance does not dominate, has an interest in widespread employment at wage 
levels permitting increased consumption, for all its tendencies to exploit labor 
wherever possible. 
Finance can, however, separate itself from the production process and 
become a preferred means of profit generation in its own right—what I mean by 
finance-dominated capitalism. This happens when, for example, speculation on 
the ups and down of a currency becomes much more profitable than building 
and selling anything. Separated in such a fashion, finance’s mechanisms for profit 
generation are no longer dependent on demand in the same way as before, and 
the link with widespread, well-paid employment is severed. Especially in financial 
trading that simply involves bets on the rise or fall in value of some asset or bets on 
the spread between assets, or financial trading that takes the form of arbitrage—in 
which money is made off of the inconsistent valuations of the same asset or finan-
cial product across different markets (e.g., the difference between what it will cost 
one to buy dollars in Britain and in Hong Kong)—there is an enormous amount 
of money to be made in finance even when, overall, economies are in very bad 
shape, with massive unemployment and high levels of even dire poverty. It doesn’t 
matter what is going on in the “real” economy; there is as much money to be made 
in finance as ever.
 Moreover, it is not simply that enormous amounts of money can be made by 
the few while everyone else is left behind and left out. It is quite possible to make 
money off their dire straits. In short, the exclusion of large numbers of people from 
economic wellbeing becomes a source of profit in finance-dominated capitalism. The 
subprime mortgage mess, for example, was aided and abetted by the fact of low-
income folks that one could get higher than average mortgage interest rates from. 
The highest possible interest rate was important—even though it signaled that the 
risk of default on these loans was higher than average—because one intended to 
use financial derivatives to repackage the loans for sale to others. What attracted 
those buyers was the higher than average interest rate and by bundling and selling 
the mortgages one fobbed the higher risk of default onto them in any case.  
A similar effect occurs when the values and practices of finance became 
dominant in corporate culture, as they have over the past thirty years: profit and 
the hardship of others become directly linked. All that starts to matter is the quar-
terly increase in the share price of the stock of one’s company and that number 
must be jacked up by every means possible—by cutting wages, firing employees, 
slashing benefits—even when none of that is particularly good for the long-term 
health of the enterprise. CEOs and other shareholders can cash out from rising 
stock values that are in this way often directly correlated with the worsening situ-
ation of the workforce. The financial finagling of private equity firms can produce 
similar results: companies are often targeted for hostile takeover when their assets 
individually are worth more than their stock valuation; money for investors can 
be made quickly in such a case simply by selling off those companies’ assets, with 
obviously dire consequences for the health of otherwise profitable businesses and 
their workforces. Takeovers like this are often financed by borrowing and these 
debts then appear on the balance sheets of the acquired companies, increasing the 
companies’ expenses and forcing even further wage, benefit, and workforce cuts, if 
these companies are to stay in business. 
National priorities that favor finance are another case in point—where 
financial profit seems to be based on, even to require the worsening condition of 
the real economy. The economic circumstances that help maintain the value of 
loans—say, low inflation and high interest rates—are often the very things that 
depress economic growth. Similarly, economic measures that make it more likely 
that a country will be able to pay back its creditors are not conducive to economic 
growth. If countries in debt to foreign creditors are going to be able to pay back 
those loans, these countries need to amass foreign reserves—say, by buying up 
US treasuries that pay low interest even when that money might be better used 
on investment in their own countries. Or these countries must increase their ratio 
of exports to imports to raise foreign reserves even when that means depressing 
their domestic economies and decreasing thereby the spending power of their own 
populations in order to do so. The international financial community has often 
tried to keep countries from deflating their currencies to make their exports more 
attractive even though export-driven growth might be the only way for these coun-
tries to stimulate their economies—because deflating their currencies raises the 
chance of default on foreign loans. Even when countries aren’t in debt to foreign 
creditors, governments more worried about having the money to pay back their 
creditors than being able to spur growth will slash budgets and raise taxes; such 
austerity measures are simply a recipe for worsening recession. A scenario like this 
has been playing out in Europe for some time now.
Finally, financial derivatives are typically ways of making money off of vola-
tility in asset prices—they are often just forms of betting on these ups and downs 
of the stock market. And volatility of all these sorts can be directly correlated with 
economic distress on the part of companies and working people. It’s very hard to 
do business, for example, when commodity prices and currency values across all 
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the markets one’s company does business in are swinging wildly from day to day—
any of those swings can spell ruin. No one with a private retirement plan needs to 
be reminded about the hardships that stock market swings can portend. And the 
difficulties that fluctuations in oil and food prices represent for whole populations 
are equally obvious. But without volatility of these sorts there is simply no money 
to be made in financial derivatives—indeed, the bigger the swings the better—
since derivatives often just involve betting on those swings.
One might argue, to the contrary, that derivatives are designed to help 
people cope with these swings. Derivatives provide companies, for example, with 
ways of hedging against the hardships that volatility can bring. If an airline is 
afraid that the price of jet fuel will go up, that airline can contract for the option 
of buying jet fuel at a certain price in future; if that target price proves wrong and 
the price of jet fuel when the time rolls around is lower, one can simply not exer-
cise the option and one will have lost only what one paid for the contract. Or one 
might argue that derivatives help bring volatility down, for example by signaling to 
market participants what those investing in derivatives think an asset it likely to be 
worth in future. But there is plenty of evidence to suggest that derivatives, rather 
than deflating the costs of volatility or bringing volatility down, serve instead to 
foment the very volatility they promise to protect market participants from, and 
eventually in so doing, produce some of the wildest swings—from boom to com-
plete bust. The derivatives that repackaged mortgages worked in that way, with 
that result. The market for those derivatives helped propel the mortgage market for 
risky loans; and that easy credit to even high-risk borrowers helped inflate hous-
ing prices—anybody could get a house, demand surged—which prompted more 
people to build houses and more people to refinance and take out bigger second 
mortgages and get further into debt. And then the whole thing collapsed when 
the rising price of housing became more than people could afford and the glut of 
new houses on the market eventually surpassed demand. Kaboom! More simply, 
betting on the decline (or upswing in value) of some asset—when a lot of people 
follow your lead and do the very same thing, as typically happens in financial 
markets—produces the very decline (or upswing) predicted and much more of 
one than would otherwise be justified by the underlying problem with the asset (or 
favorable news about it) that got anyone to bet that way to begin with.
Now if this is the sort of economy we have, one that works to the disadvan-
tage of the majority of the people, one has got to be worried about democracy. 
Wealthy interests benefiting from such an economic system would have every 
reason to use their money to take control of the reins of democratic government; 
and, once they gain that control, to use the powers of government to squelch dis-
sent and the potential social unrest that an economic system like this could very 
well help to instigate. In short, wealthy interests would have every reason, if given 
the chance, to push democracy in highly undemocratic directions. 
One might indeed be led to ask an even more fundamental question: if an 
economic system dominated by finance is not good for so many people how could 
it have been set up and how could it continue to be sustained in a democracy? And 
the easy answer is that this is all happening because we don’t live in a very genuine 
or vibrant democracy. An economic system like this that disadvantages so many 
people could not be helped into place by government action and inaction—for 
example, by Congress’ repeal of Glass-Steagall (which separated commercial from 
investment banking) or by Congress’ passing of the Commodity Futures Mod-
ernization Act in 2000 which for all intents and purposes prohibited regulation 
of derivatives—and such a system couldn’t be kept in place, if our political system 
really were in the business of serving the will of the people. Calls of distress by 
the vast majority of the people are not being heeded in Washington, while the 
demands of those with money are being heard loud and clear—their money is ob-
viously not just concentrating wealth but concentrating political power. The public 
and the media are distracted by elections and can’t seem to focus on policy debates 
once the elections are over; there is so much obfuscation out there about what’s at 
the root of our economic problems—too much regulation, not enough—and very 
little lively, and informed public discussion of the issues, which anyone pays any 
attention to, when policy is being made in Washington. And that’s the beauty of 
the Occupy Movement. It has helped open people’s eyes, gotten them to wake up,. 
It has changed the national conversation in ways that might enliven our public 
discourse and help move our democracy in more genuinely and broadly participa-
tory directions.
So there you have it: my perspective on the concerns of the Occupy Move-
ment, and what they have to do with one another, from a Christian standpoint. 
This is how I make sense of the movement as a theologian; this is the sort of con-
tribution I’d like to make to the discussion from a Christian theological vantage 
point.  And I hope this has all made some sense to you! 
